

The ‘Multicultural Family’ and the Politics of Selective Inclusion in South Korea

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Abstract

This paper discusses the rationale and the specific circumstances related to the introduction and development of multiculturalism in South Korea from the mid-2000s. It will explicate the confusion and the debates which have arisen around the proliferation of discourses on multiculturalism in South Korea. In doing so, this article highlights the centrality of the family in the implementation of the policy of multiculturalism based on various welfare measures established in 2008. The South Korean version of welfare multiculturalism raises some important questions concerning the politics of exclusion and inclusion. I argue that multicultural policy in South Korea is based on individuals within the family structure, rather than on the individuals themselves. This article will explore the implications of this family-based multiculturalism and will examine how this has influenced its development and implementation.

Key words: Multiculturalism, Multicultural Family, Welfare State, Marriage Migration, Multicultural *Han'guk*.

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Introduction

The modernisation process in East Asia tends to be understood in terms of the introduction of certain norms, ideas, and institutions from the West, and how these have combined with indigenous notions and cultural norms. In this process of Westernisation, various debates and controversies have arisen around those newly introduced notions. For example, concepts such as democracy, civil society, nationhood, citizenship, and human rights have been debated in the process of their implementation in East Asia.¹ Such debates have usually revolved around whether those Western concepts are completely alien, new and external to the society in which they are being introduced and implemented, or whether there already exist equivalent and internal notions within the society concerned. Perhaps the most famous example was the debate between Li Kwan Yew and Kim Dae-Jung on the possibility of Asian democracy, which appeared on the pages of *Foreign Affairs* in 1994.² The former Singaporean Prime Minister, Li Kwan Yew, denied the possibility of Western-style democracy in Asia; instead, he advocated East Asian culture and praised the Asian tradition of family-centred social life. On the contrary, Kim Dae Jung claimed that a strong democratic tradition already existed in Asian culture, which meant that it would be possible to realise democracy without necessarily contradicting East Asian tradition.

This brings the debate back to the question of whether or not democracy can be considered a universal notion, and this involves the question of the relationship between universalism and particularism. In other words, Western notions such as democracy, civil society, and human rights have been given the status of universal concepts and what matters is whether such universal values are compatible with the culture of a particular society or not.

Following on from the process of political democratisation, a debate on multiculturalism arose in South Korea in the 2000s that appears to repeat the relationship between universalism and particularism, which had been seen in the discussion of democracy. However, it did not follow exactly the same formulation. The most remarkable difference is that culture itself has become the central issue in constructing the discourse of multiculturalism, rather than being viewed as a dependent factor. The conceptual predicament inherent in any discussion of multiculturalism lies in the fact that multiculturalism is premised on the idea that every culture is unique and different, and that these cultural differences must be respected and maintained, rather than integrated into the dominant culture.³

In South Korea, the confusion which has arisen around multiculturalism comes from the perception that South Korea is a mono-ethnic nation that has maintained a mono-culture (although this is condemned as 'pure blood ideology' or 'mono-ethnic nationalism' by the promoters of multiculturalism). According to this perception,

foreign nationals currently residing in South Korea are not deemed to have formed significant ethnic groups, and so the plurality of cultures which forms the basis for the implementation of multiculturalism does not exist. One interesting response to such a seemingly predicated condition for multiculturalism was the cultivation of multi-cultures (*tamunhwa*)⁴ based on families. Thus, multiculturalism has come to be articulated in South Korea through families, rather than through ethnic communities or individuals, and this particular aspect makes the South Korean case quite different from the experience of multiculturalism in Western societies.

In this paper, I will provide a brief overview of the background to the emergence of multiculturalism in South Korea and will then proceed to discuss how multiculturalism has been adapted from Western models and used differently in South Korea, highlighting the legislation of some welfare measures for multicultural families.

The Emergence of Multicultural Governance: Why Multicultural Families?

Regardless of one's opinions about the meaning of multiculturalism and how it can be put into practice, it is impossible to deny that the population of foreign nationals has been increasing in South Korea. It is also widely accepted that this trend is unlikely to be reversed in the future. This demographic change provides a solid basis for the argument that multiculturalism is the inevitable route for South Korea to take in dealing with its foreign immigrants.

Demographic statistics in terms of nationality first became available in 2009 when the Ministry of Public Administration and Security conducted a survey based on data from the registration of foreign nationals and family relationship registrations.⁵ According to these statistics and other sources, the number of foreign nationals has been increasing year by year, and had exceeded the symbolically significant level of one million in 2007. The figure for 2010 provided by the Ministry of Justice shows that the total number of foreign nationals was 1.25 million, comprising 2.48 per cent of the whole population. In addition to these foreign national migrants, the total number of migrants from foreign countries was estimated at 1.49 million, including those who had adopted Korean nationality (about 100,000), marriage migrants' children (about 122,000) and North Korean refugees (about 20,000).⁶ However, there are slight differences in the numbers of 'foreigners', depending on which the Ministry provides the data and on how the category of 'foreigners' is defined in the survey. Thus, the Ministry of Public Administration and Security devised the notion of 'foreign residents' [외국인주민, *oegug-in chumin*].

While the large number proves the significant presence of foreign nationals, the details and the heterogeneous composition of these foreign nationals raises profound questions about the meaning of multiculturalism. For example, foreign nationals are divided into various categories, such as foreign professionals, students, labourers, and female marriage migrants. This diverse composition is the main source of the tension and confusion which surrounds public discourses on multiculturalism in South Korea. For example, it is doubtful whether the framework of multiculturalism is adequate to account for overseas Koreans from China [*Chosŏn-jok*] and the former Soviet Union

[*Koryŏ saram*], as they are generally considered to be too similar to South Koreans to be viewed as a different cultural group.⁷

In addition to changes in demographic composition, the rise of multiculturalism as a social norm has led to the requirement for the South Korean Government to meet international standards on human rights in their treatment of foreign nationals and for NGOs to recognise and seek to improve the basic rights of guest workers and marriage migrants. These social movements have taken various approaches in addressing social issues connected with the working and living conditions of foreign nationals, protesting against discrimination and prejudice endorsed and neglected by the Government, but sometimes these movements had been working in collaboration with the Government, in particular, during the Roh Moo-hyun administration (2003-7). Indeed, the word ‘multi-culture’ [*tamunhwa*] is a term which South Korean NGOs adopted as a central tenet in tackling legal and social problems in the treatment of foreign nationals.⁸ However, in terms of policy and the pursuit of multiculturalism at the state level, the watershed years for the development of multiculturalism were 2006 and 2008.

In 2006, when Hines Ward, a Korean-American football hero born to a Korean mother and an African-American father, visited South Korea, his visit kindled public interest in multicultural issues, especially towards mixed-race children. Coinciding with the visit of Hines Ward, early engagement with multiculturalism during the later period of the Roh government should also be viewed against the background of an explicit and outspoken racism in the post-Korean War period in South Korea towards mixed-blood children (*honhyŏr-a*), who were the result of sexual relations between Korean women and American GIs.⁹ The legal status of such children was complicated by the fact that the newly founded Syngman Rhee (Yi Sŭngman, 1875-1965) government, basing its policy on patriarchal kinship laws, did not grant citizenship to mixed-blood children if their biological fathers were not citizens of the Republic of Korea, while the US Government denied citizenship to those children who moved to America as their citizenship laws were more concerned with the biological mother’s citizenship.¹⁰

Therefore, civil movements to promote the rights of foreign nationals and to rectify vernacular racism towards mixed-blood children both preceded along the current of the ‘South Korean version of multiculturalism’ [*Han ’guk-chŏk tamunhwa chu’i*] and the resulting legislation in 2008 which recognised families as a legal entity which were composed of Korean and non-Korean parents and their children.

However, bringing multicultural families into the focus of governmental policies dealing with problems raised by foreign nationals only came about after consultation with various academic groups and special committees in the late period of the Roh government. As a first step, the Roh government focused on the mixed-blood offspring of Korean and other nationals, and children born in Korea who were adopted overseas so that the state could do something for these children such as obtaining South Korean citizenship or enabling less restricted entrance to South Korea. Indeed, perhaps thanks to the activity of the Government and NGOs in South Korea, *honhyŏr-a*, the Korean term for mixed-blood, has now become a taboo word not only in the public sphere but also in general society. Instead, the word for ‘multi-

culture' [*tamunhwa*] has become the standard way to refer to the children born from racially mixed couples. However, even if the racist connotation has been expunged with the change of the wording, it is hardly possible to conclude that the term 'multi-culture' has become neutral. As I shall go on to discuss, the introduction of multiculturalism and the expansion and development of multicultural policies in South Korea has begun to create a new social category and a new form of stigmatisation.

In a wider context, the emergence of the multiculturalist agenda has been in response to the recommendations of international organisations overseeing standards for various human rights issues, including the status of migrants in South Korea.¹¹ In 2006, the Government organised a special committee directly under the Presidential Committee of the Northeast Asian Period to investigate and produce special reports on policy direction concerning foreign nationals. During this speculative phase regarding issues touching on multiculturalism, the Government initially did not regard multiculturalism as the key agenda, but instead took a wide-ranging approach addressing issues associated with various groups of foreign nationals including marriage migrants, guest workers, and overseas Koreans, as shown by the reports from academic researchers.¹² Based on the commissioned research and consultations, the Government introduced the 'Law on the Status of Foreign Nationals' in 2006, the 'Law on the Support for Multicultural Families' in 2007, and amended the 'Law on the Employment of Foreign Nationals' in 2007 which allowed overseas Koreans to work for five years as visitors.

The question then arises of how and why families have become the central focus of Government policies for multiculturalism in South Korea? South Korean researchers working on the issue of multiculturalism tend to conclude that multiculturalist policies focussing on families are the result of compromises on two levels. Firstly, at the level of policy-making in the bureaucratic system, several ministries - such as the Ministries of Justice, Foreign Affairs and Trade, Gender Equality and Family, Education, Public Administration and Security, and Health and Welfare - are involved in the regulations and policies concerning foreign nationals with a focus on families. In contrast, issues concerning guest workers tend to be restricted to fewer ministries. Thus, focussing on multicultural families is helpful in the sense that it engages with more ministries. Therefore, South Korean researchers consider that multicultural policy is partly the result of a compromise among the competing bureaucratic organisations seeking to take the initiative in the burgeoning multicultural agenda.¹³

Secondly, family-centred multiculturalist policies were designed to avert the risk of potential complaints from the general public, which might have arisen if individual migrant workers had been seen as receiving special treatment and benefits from multicultural policies. In this context, the predicated position of marriage migrant women is emphasised in the rhetoric of family-centred multiculturalism, drawing on the demographic crisis in the population due to the low birth rate. Thus, the women who come to South Korea for the purpose of marriage are considered to carry the dual images of both saviours and victims. On the one hand, they are viewed as filling the gap in the marriage market by becoming partners of men who find it hard to obtain a co-national spouse. An interesting aspect of the migration of these women to South

Korea is that these marriages are often encouraged and systematically arranged by the state, especially by local authorities in rural areas.¹⁴ In these areas, where the majority of the population is made up of elderly people and their bachelor sons who are unable to attract contemporary South Korean women as marriage partners, marriage migrants are viewed as saviours of a crumbling rural life, who also help to prop up the declining birth rate. The decreasing population in rural areas and the lack of young women willing to become wives and carers in rural families symbolises the crisis of the whole nation struggling with its low reproduction rate.

This image of marriage migrant women as saviours is combined with an appreciation of their vulnerable position in an alien country. Even before coming to South Korea, important social issues associated with the marriage process have been highlighted in the media such as the hasty process of meeting, dating, engagement, and the wedding (all of this may take place in the space of just a few days), and it reminds people of the practice of 'buying brides' from poor countries.¹⁵ Furthermore, after coming to South Korea as brides, domestic violence and abuse by in-laws and husbands has become a social issue inviting public intervention. More directly related to the multicultural agenda, language barriers and the lack of cultural knowledge are viewed as problems which must be addressed by multiculturalist policies for these women in order to help them to settle in and raise their children.

Lastly and most importantly, marriage migrant women are the only migrant group legally allowed to settle permanently in South Korea.¹⁶ Other guest workers are only allowed to reside temporarily for a maximum period of up to 4 years and 10 months, which prevents them from fulfilling the necessary requirement of 5 years' lawful residency for permanent settlement. The institutionalisation of multiculturalism enables the government to intervene in domestic life, giving a helping hand to marriage migrant women to enable them to perform their roles as wives and mothers, in which they would conventionally have been helped and supervised by their own mothers and mothers-in-law. However, the implication of the governance on cultural difference by the law and institutionalised welfare policies extends beyond the domain of multicultural families, and it can be viewed as a process for the expansion of the neo-liberal welfare state in South Korea.

As Song has argued, the South Korean state selects the beneficiaries of state welfare according to the criteria of 'worthiness' and this criteria can create social segregation, which seems to be the case for multicultural welfare policies.¹⁷ In this context, the criteria for the worthiness for state welfare benefits is justified by the state in connection with the ideology for the reproduction of the family. Without regard to whether the beneficiaries of the state welfare were single mothers or breadwinning men in unemployment, 'the normative family ideology' is mobilised as the reason for state support or neglect, in effect enabling the state to evade public demands for wider and more universal forms of welfare policies.¹⁸ This South Korean neo-liberal governance based on the family ideology described by Song is replicated in the policy making of the multiculturalist agenda.¹⁹

The Inherent Limits of Family-centred Multiculturalism in South Korea

Paradoxically, as the policies outlined above began to be implemented, the circumstantial rationale that motivated the Government to promote family-centred multiculturalism has worked in such a way as to reveal its inherent limitations. In this section, I will examine some critiques which highlight the limitations of the current South Korean version of family-centred multiculturalism and I will further argue that these limitations may provide the actors concerned with multiculturalism with a social field which is still undefined and flexible and which can be shaped by the actors' practices and other socio-cultural contexts in the future.

The most common critique of the current form of South Korean multiculturalism points out its patriarchal aspects in defining the legal status of the marriage migrant women, who have to be persons attached to their spouse within the family structure.²⁰ There are interlinked laws, creating different legal persons, which sometimes create contradictions between the laws. For example, the notion of a marriage migrant is introduced in the 'Act on the Treatment of Foreigners in Korea', and is then utilised in the 'Multicultural Family Support Act', so that a 'multicultural family' is defined as a 'family composed of a Korean national from birth and a marriage migrant [결혼이민자, *kyōrhon iminja*]'.²¹ While naturalised marriage migrants are still included in the category of marriage migrants in the 'Multicultural Family Support Act', the 'Act on the Treatment of Foreigners in Korea' presents some contradictions, as it considers marriage migrants as 'foreigners', despite their naturalisation.²² This reveals the inherent prejudice of the policy makers and presents the discrepancy between legal and socio-cultural citizenship.

As I have shown in the previous section, the right of residence for marriage migrant women is not granted on an individual basis until naturalisation, but is defined in relationship to their spouse or offspring, thus placing these women in a vulnerable position. Some matters regarding the residency rights of marriage migrants are dealt with by more than one single law or regulation, thereby causing some confusion both in concept and practice. In other words, there is a categorical discrepancy concerning the legal status of persons in multicultural policies as defined by the relevant legislation and rules.

Secondly, family-centred multicultural policies are oriented towards integration and incorporation, rather than endeavouring to foster and maintain the migrants' cultural differences. This tendency has become prevalent following the wide-scale opening of Multicultural Family Support Centres in local areas and the introduction of various kinds of programmes at local centres.²³ The programmes provided in the local support centres usually focus on the marriage migrants' successful adaptation and integration into South Korean society, highlighting their caring roles as wives and mothers. For example, marriage migrant women learn the Korean language, have Korean cooking lessons, and receive guidance on raising children and supporting them at school. Local centres are run by civil organisations commissioned by the local administrations and they are monitored within the administrative hierarchy, as the contract is temporary and is renewed based on monitoring and evaluation. In the same way as there is competition among bureaucrats in the central government to make an impact and secure resources around the multiculturalist agenda, local administrations also compete with each other for funding from the central government. Therefore,

local centres are urged to take into account Government policies, which are designed to integrate and incorporate marriage migrants into South Korean society.

Thirdly, a concern over the risk of stigmatisation is emerging as the multiculturalist policies develop and expand, especially in regard to the children of ‘multicultural families’. Since marriage migrants began to come to South Korea, the number of children born to marriage migrants has been increasing, and now many of these children have reached school age. According to the latest survey by the Ministry of Public Administration and Security, it is reported that there were 168,583 children from marriages between Korean nationals and marriage migrants in 2012.²⁴ As I discussed earlier, multiculturalism is a good agenda for Government departments and administrations to engage with, and the children from multicultural family are no exception to this. The Ministry of Education has joined the multiculturalist whirl and has provided policy guidelines for teachers and educational administrators. These guidelines are aimed not only at children from multicultural families, but at all children. Such multicultural education usually involves a change of curriculum so that teaching and learning is more sensitive towards racially different children. The most famous educational episode was the change of reference to peach colour, which used to be called ‘skin colour’ [*sal saek*]. In the early 2000s, civil activists working for the rights of migrant workers ran a campaign to change the name of peach colour from *sal saek* to ‘apricot colour’ [*salgu saek*], as it gives the skin colour of ethnic Koreans universal status. The campaign succeeded, leading the National Human Rights Commission of the Republic of Korea to order the Korean Agency for Technology and Standards to change the name of the colour in question. This campaign shows that the multiculturalism promoted by civil activists was a counter-concept in an effort to rectify racist prejudice.

However, there has been a subtle shift in educational direction since the legislation of the ‘Multicultural Family Support Act’. As shown in the change of the term used to refer to skin colour, before the state took the initiative in the multicultural agenda, the focus was placed on the moral education and enlightenment of school children. Some of the curriculum for multicultural education tends to victimise multicultural families and to make them ‘the other’, and also special support for children from multicultural families tends to reinforce their otherness.²⁵ Furthermore, the expansion of state-led multiculturalism created social spaces, in particular in cyber space, where xenophobic discourses and anti-migration campaigns are proliferating, opposing the Government’s multicultural policies.

Becoming Multicultural *Han’gug-in* and the Agency of Marriage Migrants

The inherent limits of multiculturalism in South Korea, which I examined in the previous section, have led many scholars and civil rights activists to make critiques of state-led multiculturalism. Scholars who advocate multicultural ideals denounce South Korean multiculturalism as nothing other than an assimilation policy, which does not recognise the rights of minorities.²⁶ They point out that state-led multiculturalism is completely different from the purported ideals of multiculturalism - the achievement of justice and the prevention of discrimination based on cultural differences,²⁷ and the respect for and fostering of cultural differences as proposed by theorists of recognition-based multiculturalism.

The anthropologist Verena Stockle noted in her study of European society that culture can be mobilised as a guise for racist discourse. She observed that Europeans who used to say, 'We can't live together with migrants due to our racial difference', changed their racist narrative by replacing 'racial difference' with 'cultural difference' in the emergence of multiculturalism. She referred to this argument which attributes cultural difference to human nature as 'cultural fundamentalism'.²⁸ Her insight is crucial in the sense that multiculturalism may be viewed as being in a continuum with racism, despite the fact that the focus has shifted from natural and biological human traits to arguments based on national belonging and shared cultural distinctiveness in justifying exclusion and discrimination.

Similarly, Han Kyung Koo has argued that 'many advocates of multiculturalism in Korea are nationalists who view multiculturalism as a survival strategy for the nation-state'.²⁹ He points out the illusion policy makers hold in regards to their understanding of the constructed opposition between the 'ethnic homogeneity' of Korea and multiculturalism; he claims that they are 'engaging the wrong enemy', as Koreans traditionally did not discriminate against outsiders or strangers based on 'blood', but on 'culture'. Through an historical overview of the treatment of the Chinese, the Jurchens, and the Japanese, he traces the criteria for the acceptance of or discrimination against aliens and immigrants during the pre-modern period (the Koryŏ and Chosŏn eras – 918-1910). According to his study, the criteria lay in the notion of 'intention to be civilised' or of cultural adaptation, which was based on the very 'sense of cultural distinctiveness and superiority' of the Korean nation.³⁰ In other words, prejudice and discrimination towards alien people derived from the very notion of civilisation, rather than blood-based ethnic homogeneity. Therefore, Han locates contemporary state-led multiculturalism in South Korea in a continuum with the civilisation-based discrimination and prejudice embedded in traditional Korean society, and questions the conventional understanding which tends to view ethnic homogeneity as the main obstacle to multiculturalism.³¹

Therefore, multiculturalism may be viewed as fundamentally parochial in nature, as indicated by references to the 'American way of life', 'British way of life', 'Canadian way of life', 'Australian way of life', etc.; it allows for diversity, but only within limits set by the national way of life. Indeed, Sŭngwan Han, drawing on the work of Will Kymlicka and Keith Banting, has suggested that liberal nationalism and multiculturalism may not be mutually exclusive, but may be complementary in a benign sense.³² Indeed, South Korea may be considered to be on the verge of creating the 'Korean way of life' in a multicultural sense and the contents of this expansive notion of 'Korea' or *Han'guk* (South Korea) is not necessarily an ethnic notion. Although I have discussed the limits, the selective nature of multicultural policies, and the contradictions among the laws related to multiculturalism, it is hard to deny that multiculturalism has provided marriage migrant women with a new social field where social actors engage with the multicultural agenda, albeit not always in the way that the state initially intended. As Kim Minjung has shown in her research on the lives of families formed by international marriage, not only marriage migrants but also their children regard themselves as *Han'gug-in* and this perception and their practices are already changing the ethnic notion of *Han'gug-in* - expanding it to become a more culturally inclusive notion, based on legal citizenship.³³ They live as various

Han'gug-in within families, and this is why state-led multiculturalism based on families is so effective in South Korea, despite its inherent limits and the criticisms which have been leveled against it.

Endnotes

¹ William A. Callahan, 'Comparing the Discourse of Popular Politics in Korea and China: From Civil Society to Social Movements', pp. 278.

He rightly points out that the question is not whether there are 'authentic' concepts such as civil society in East Asia, 'but how different groups are using this [kind of] concept ... in very political ways'.

² See Kim, Dae Jung. 1994. 'Is Culture Destiny? The Myth of Asia's Anti-Democratic Values'. See also Lee, Kuan Yew, 'Culture Is Destiny: A Conversation with Lee Kuan Yew'.

³ Ernesto Laclau, 'Universalism, Particularism, and the Question of Identity.'

⁴ Though the transliteration of the Korean word, 'multi-culture' (*tamunhwa*), can be confused with another Korean word 'other culture' (*ta'munhwa*), I use the McCune-Reischauer transliteration system for coherence in the transliteration used in this paper.

⁵ Kim, Sŏnghoe, 'Han'gug-ŭi imin·tamunhwa t'onghap chŏngch'aek hyŏnhwang-gwa munje-jŏm', [The Status and Problems of the Unified Policy of Korean Immigrant Multiculturalism], p. 18.

⁶ Ibid. p. 19. This cites the Policy Plan for Foreign Nationals by the Ministry of Justice.

⁷ I will not discuss the position of these overseas Koreans from the former socialist bloc in this paper.

⁸ Kim, Chŏngsŏn, 'Simin'gwŏn ŏpnŭn pokchi chŏngch'aeg-ŭrosŏ 'Han'guk-sik' tamunhwajuŭi-e taehan pip'an-jŏk koch'al' [Critical Research on the Non-citizenship Welfare Policy of Korean-style Multiculturalism], pp. 216-220.

⁹ Chŏn, Kyŏngsu, et.al., Introduction to *Honhyŏr-esŏ Tamunhwaro*.

¹⁰ Park, Bongsoo. 'Intimate Encounters, Racial Frontiers: Stateless GI Babies in South Korea and the United States, 1953-1965', pp. 29-32.

The household registration law was abolished and changed to a law concerning family relationships in 2007, with the amendment taking effect from 2008. With the change in the law, women were allowed to pass on their surnames to their children, whereas this had been prohibited under the old law. The change also denoted that the legal unity for family relationship was now the individual, whereas previously the

household represented by the male head was viewed as the only meaningful legal entity in kinship law. However, well before this amendment, in 1997 there was a small change in the naturalisation law which allowed children of Korean mothers with fathers of foreign origin to be registered as dependents of the mother. See Kwak, Paehŭi. ‘Pumo Yanggye hyölt’ong chu’ui-nŭn yeoe-ga anin wönc’h’ik’ [Bilateral Succession is not an Exception, but a Principle].

¹¹ The most relevant international policy guideline for the multicultural agenda in South Korea is the Declaration of Cultural Rights and Diversity by UNESCO in 2005.

¹² Two reports which came out from this commissioned work. See Kim, Hye-soon, et al., *Tongbuk A ‘tamunhwa’ sidae Han’guk sahoe-ŭi pyönhwa-wa t’onghap* [Change and Integration in Korean Society in the Era of Northeast Asian Multiculturalism]. See also Kim, Hye-soon, et al, *Han’guk-chök tamunhwajuŭi-ŭi iron-hwa* [The Theory of a Korean-style Multiculturalism].

¹³ See Kim, Chöng-sön, ‘Simin’gwön öpnŭn pokchi chöngch’aeg-ŭrosö ‘Han’guk-sik’ tamunhwajuŭi-e taehan pip’an-jök koch’al’ [Critical Research on the Non-citizenship Welfare Policy of Korean-style Multiculturalism]. See also Hwang, Chöngmi, ‘Kajok-kwa kukkyöng – Han’guk tamunhwa chöngch’aeg-ŭi chön’gae-gwa chöng-e nat’anan kajok ajenda koch’al’ [Boundaries and the Family – Research on the Family Agenda Arising from the Development and Affection of the Policy of Korean Multiculturalism].

¹⁴ Kim, Chöng-sön, op.cit.; Caren Freeman, ‘Introduction’ and Chapter 6 to *Making and Faking Kinship: Marriage and Labor Migration Between China and South Korea*.

¹⁵ This is a popular perception of marriage migrant women in South Korea. For a critical review of this perception, see Sö, Tökhŭi, ‘Han’guk tamunhwa yön’gu-ŭi t’ükching-gwa han’gye: kukche kyörhon-i chuyö-söng, kŭrigo kŭ chanyö-e kwanhan chilchök yön’gur-ŭl chungsim-ŭro’ [The Limitations and Characteristics of Research on Korean Multiculturalism: With Special Emphasis on Qualitative Research on the Children (of Multicultural Families)], pp. 5–32.

¹⁶ Some male guest workers get married to local Korean women and settle in South Korea permanently, changing their status from migrant workers to marriage migrants. However, the number of these men is much smaller than the women who come to South Korea in order to get married.

¹⁷ Song, Jesook, ‘Family Breakdown and Invisible Homeless Women: Neoliberal Governance During the Asian Debt Crisis in South Korea, 1997-2001’, pp. 49-50.

¹⁸ For example, ‘Social service tailored to life cycles for multicultural family support’ is a programme run by the Ministry of Gender Equality and the Family and this policy wording (‘tailored to life cycles’), which was initially used for multicultural family support, has been used as a representative catchphrase during the election campaign

of President Park Geun-hye in 2012. Whether this pilot welfare programme, initially aimed at multicultural families, will remain a selective and limited one or become the basis for the expansion of a wider and more general welfare programme seems to be highly dependent on the route the Park government chooses to take and the level of engagement by the civil sector with this issue.

¹⁹ Song, *op. cit.*, pp. 47-51.

²⁰ With the amendment of the nationality law in 1997, the regulation concerning patrilineal descent for naturalisation changed to a cognatic one. Reflecting this change, the Multicultural Family Support Act is written with gender-neutral terms. However, given that marriage migrants are almost all women, the use of gender-neutral terms does not change the patriarchal aspect in the naturalization process for women. The number of marriage migrants among ‘foreign residents [외국인주민]’ was 220,687 in 2012 and nearly 90 per cent of these marriage migrants were women. See Ministry of Public Administration and Security, *2012 nyŏn chibang chach’i tanch’e oegug-in hyŏnhwang chosa kyŏlkwa* [2012 Survey Report of the Condition of Foreigners in Regional Municipal Entities].

²¹ Hwang Chŏngmi discusses the ambiguity of the notion of ‘marriage migrants’, citing Seol et al. (2009) in her paper ‘Kajok-kwa kukkyŏng’, pp. 155-156. She points out that there is a discrepancy concerning the notion of ‘marriage migrants’, depending on the laws applied. For example, marriage migrants are foreign nationals according to the ‘Basic Law on the Treatment of Foreign Nationals in Korea’, but naturalised marriage migrants are also considered to be ‘marriage migrants’. Thus, this discrepancy in the definition of marriage migrants was addressed by including naturalised persons into the category of marriage migrants in the ‘Multicultural Family Support Act’.

²² *Ibid.*, p. 156.

²³ In 2011, there were 210 Multicultural Family Support Centres operating in South Korea, according to Kim, Chŏngsŏn, *op. cit.*, p. 233.

²⁴ Ministry of Public Administration and Security, *op. cit.* Even if these children are Korean nationals from birth according to the Nationality Law, the Ministry of Public Administration and Security views these children as belonging to ‘foreign residents’.

²⁵ Seol, Dong-hoon et. al., *Tamunhwa kajog-ŭi chungjanggi chŏnmang mit taech’aek yŏn’gu: Tamunhwa kajog-ŭi changnae in’gu ch’ugye mit sahoe kyŏngje-jŏk hyogwa punsŏg-ŭl chungsim-ŭro* [Research on Medium and Long-term Prospects of the Multicultural Family and Counter Measures: With a Special Emphasis on the Economic Benefits and the Prospective Population Estimates of the Multicultural Family].

²⁶ O, Kyŏngsŏk, ‘Ŏttŏn tamunhwa chuŭi in’ga?: tamunhwa sahoe nonŭi-e kwanhan

pip'an-chök chomang' [What Multiculturalism is it? Critical Perspectives on the Theory of a Multicultural Society], pp. 21-56.

²⁷ Nancy Fraser, 'From Redistribution to Recognition? Dilemmas of Justice in a 'Post-Socialist' Age', pp. 68-93.

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²⁸ Verena Stolcke, 'Talking Culture: New Boundaries, New Rhetoric of Exclusion in Europe', pp. 1-24.

²⁹ Han, Kyung-Koo, 'The Archaeology of the Ethnically Homogeneous Nation-State and Multiculturalism in Korea', p. 11.

³⁰ Ibid, p. 16.

³¹ Ibid, pp. 25-28.

³² Han, Sŭngwan (2009), and Kymlicka and Banting (2006) critically examine the claim that multicultural policies eroded the welfare state and argue that there is no evidence for such a claim, taking examples from several countries. In doing so, they highlight the more inclusive effect of multicultural policies.

³³ Kim, Minjung, 'Kukche kyörhon kajok-kwa chanyö-üi söngjang: yörö chongnyu-üi Han'gugin-i kajog-üro saragagi' [Various Korean Families: International Marriage Families and the Development of Their Children], pp. 60, 85.

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